Fraud Prevention
Remittance fraud: protecting cross-border transfers with phone signals
Cross-border remittance is exposed at both ends of the transfer. On the sender side, an attacker takes over a real customer's account and initiates a transfer to their own beneficiary. On the recipient side, the receiving account was registered with a disposable number by a money mule. Telecom signals apply at both ends: number type and active status on the sender at account creation and login, SIM swap detection and active status on the recipient before funds are credited.
The two fraud surfaces in a remittance flow
Remittance platforms handle transfers that cross both currency and regulatory borders. The legitimate use case is high-frequency, low-margin payments from diaspora communities to families abroad. The fraud use case mirrors this pattern: relatively small, repeated transfers that fit within normal transaction profiles.
The sender side is vulnerable to account takeover. An attacker who gains control of a registered sender's account can change the beneficiary details and initiate transfers that look indistinguishable from the sender's normal behaviour. The phone number is the authentication anchor for password resets and OTPs; a SIM swap breaks that anchor before the attack begins.
The recipient side is vulnerable to mule accounts. Mule networks register accounts at scale using disposable non-fixed VoIP numbers, collect transfers, and move funds onward. The number type signal catches this at registration, before the account is used to receive a single transfer.
Signals for the sender side
A sender account registered with a non-fixed VoIP number is higher risk. Legitimate remittance senders register with a personal mobile number. Screen at sign-up and at any point where the sender's phone number is updated on the account.
Confirm the sender's number is active at the point of authentication. An inactive number on an account attempting a transfer may indicate the account has been abandoned and reclaimed, or that the number has been reassigned. Check with the active status API before issuing an OTP.
A SIM swap on the sender's number in the period preceding a transfer, especially one to a new beneficiary, is a strong ATO indicator. Check simSwap and simSwapAt before authorising any transfer that adds a new recipient or changes an existing beneficiary's bank details.
Signals for the recipient side
When your platform requires recipients to register, screen the recipient's phone number at sign-up. A non-fixed VoIP recipient account in a typical receiving corridor is anomalous. Most legitimate recipients in markets such as Nigeria, Philippines, Mexico or India register with a local mobile SIM.
Confirm the recipient's number is active before crediting their account. An inactive number on a receiving account is unusual and worth holding for review, particularly for first-time transfers to that recipient.
If the recipient's registered mobile number has been swapped recently, the account may have been taken over. A SIM swap on the receiving end combined with an unusually large incoming transfer is a pattern worth flagging before funds are disbursed. This check is especially valuable in markets where SIM swap is a known mule-account technique.
Coverage note: recipient-side checks depend on signal availability for the recipient's market. Confirm coverage for your receiving corridors before building rules on recipient-side signals outside Telebase's core markets.
What a Telebase lookup returns
curl -s 'https://telebase.fatcatremote.com/api/lookup?phone=%2B447700900000' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer tb_live_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
{
"phoneNumber": "+447700900000",
"active": true,
"carrier": "EE",
"country": "GB",
"numberType": "mobile",
"simSwap": "UNKNOWN", // launching for GB, DE, NL and FR
"simSwapAt": null,
"_meta": { "activeSource": "LINE_STATUS" }
}
The same call covers carrier, number type, active status and SIM swap in one query. Run it on both sender and recipient phone numbers. The full ATO signal framework is at account takeover prevention with telecom signals.